Secure Beef Supply (SBS) Plan for Continuity of Business

Introduction

Foot and mouth disease (FMD) is a highly contagious foreign animal disease that affects cattle and other cloven-hooved animals, such as swine, sheep, goats, and deer. FMD is not a public health or food safety concern. The United States eradicated FMD in 1929 but it is present in many other countries and causes severe animal production losses. Industry, state, and federal officials have worked collaboratively with cattle disease experts to develop response plans should FMD virus infect susceptible animals in the United States. Response strategies for controlling and stopping the spread of this animal disease include stopping movement of susceptible animals and their products, rapid identification of infected animals, strategic depopulation with proper disposal, and vaccination. Responsible Regulatory Officials (local, state, tribal and federal officials, as appropriate) have the authority and responsibility to establish regulatory Control Areas around FMD infected premises. They can also regulate animal, animal product (semen, embryos), and other movements that pose a risk to virus spread within, into, and out of these Control Areas.

Purpose of the Secure Beef Supply Plan

The Secure Beef Supply (SBS) Plan provides the guidance for a workable business continuity plan for beef premises **with no evidence of FMD infection** located in a regulatory Control Area and allied industries that is credible to Responsible Regulatory Officials. Continuity of business (COB) for the beef industry revolves around the ability to move those animals with no evidence of infection and located within a Control Area to slaughter and processing facilities and between production phases. Officials must balance the risks of allowing movement of animals to slaughter and processing facilities and between production premises against the impact of not allowing movement.

Participation in the SBS Plan is voluntary. Having the SBS Plan guidance available and implemented, when possible, prior to an FMD outbreak enhances coordination and communication between all stakeholders. The intent is to speed up a successful FMD response and eventually enable the issuance of movement permits after the extent of the outbreak is understood. This will support COB for cattle producers, transporters, packers, processors, and allied industries who choose to participate.

The SBS Plan is the result of a multi-year collaborative effort by industry, state, federal, and academic representatives. Funding for its development was provided by USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). The SBS Plan provides **guidance only**. In an actual outbreak, decisions will be made by the Responsible Regulatory Officials based on the unique characteristics of the outbreak.

The **purpose of this document** is to provide a succinct overview of the SBS Plan and related resources to industry stakeholders and Responsible Regulatory Officials. It facilitates beef industry preparedness for, and response to, an FMD outbreak.

FMD Response Guidance Documents

There are several guidance documents for Responsible Regulatory Officials to use in an FMD Outbreak. The goals of the SBS Plan align with these guidance documents.

- **Strategic guidance** for responding to FMD in the United States can be found in the following *Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP)* documents:
    - *Foot-and-Mouth Disease Response Plan: The Red Book*
    - *Ready Reference Guides* accompany many of the detailed documents and materials below and offer quick summaries of the information for training and educational purposes.

- Strategies for a managed response to an FMD outbreak will change as the outbreak progresses (phase) and will depend upon the magnitude (type), location of the outbreak, vaccine availability, and other characteristics.
    - These pre-defined **phases and types of an FMD outbreak** are described in the guideline document *FAD PReP Classification of Phases and Types of a Foot-and-Mouth Disease Outbreak and Response*. This document helps facilitate the development of adaptable emergency response and business continuity plans for the U.S. livestock industry in the event of an FMD outbreak in North America.

- **Surveillance, epidemiology, and tracing** techniques will be utilized by Responsible Regulatory Officials during the outbreak to detect new cases, understand and adapt to the outbreak situation, and provide information for decision making and disease control procedures. The USDA has developed the *FAD PReP/National Animal Health Emergency Management System (NAHEMS) Guidelines: Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Tracing*. These activities likely will lead to additional regulatory activities such as quarantine and movement controls.
    - **Proposed animal surveillance** methods to demonstrate a lack of evidence of FMD infection may allow animal and/or product movement to support business continuity without increasing the risk of spreading infection are described in *Surveillance Guidance to Support the Secure Beef Supply (SBS) Continuity of Business Plan during an FMD Outbreak*.
    - The Bovine Germplasm Movement Plan (BGMP) guidance describes specific surveillance and movement options for domestic bovine germplasm (semen, embryos, oocytes) and high genomic merit cattle[1] movement from animals with no evidence of infection to maintain dairy and beef production and business continuity in the event of an FMD outbreak.

- **Quarantine and movement controls** are critical activities to control FMD. These approaches include establishing a Control Area around each infected premises and issuing movement restrictions for cattle and other susceptible animals and their products in a Control Area. The USDA has developed the *FAD PReP/NAHEMS Guidelines: Quarantine and Movement Control* to describe these measures.

- **Continuity of business (COB)** activities for premises with no evidence of infection in a Control Area aim to minimize disruptions to commerce caused by quarantine and movement restrictions and decrease the economic consequences of an FMD outbreak. The USDA has developed *FAD PReP/NAHEMS Continuity of Business (COB) Guidelines*. These guidelines provide the basis for managed movement – which is an important component of business continuity – of animals with no evidence of infection and their products from within a Control Area in a FAD incident.

- **Emergency response management** during an FMD outbreak involves considerable amounts of data, including investigation records, premises identification numbers, individual animal and herd-level laboratory test results, movement permits, and resource allocation information. **Producers in a Control Area will be required to have a National Premises Identification Number (PIN) to request movement permits in an outbreak.** PINs are available from the office of the State Animal Health Official (SAHO) at: https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal-disease/traceability/pin. States may consider transferring their accurate premises data into the USDA Emergency Management Response System (EMRS) prior to any outbreak. EMRS is the USDA APHIS official system of record for all animal health incidents; therefore, all data needed to request movement permits will be entered into EMRS. This greatly facilitates response efforts.

[1] These animals have unique genetic traits or genomic results that rank them in the top 1-2% of their breed. This could be determined by their breed specific indices like Net Merit (NM$) or Total Performance Index (TPI) for Holsteins; Jersey Production Index (JPI) for Jerseys and Expected Progeny Differences (EPD) for beef breeds.

For more information, refer to *USDA Premises Data Transfer to EMRS from External/State-Based Systems, June 15, 2020,* at: and *Ready Reference Guide – Introduction to EMRS2*, January 2020.

- **Permits issued in an FAD outbreak serve to document movements** of animals and animal products into, within, and out of a regulatory Control Area. There are two types of permits in an FMD outbreak: specific and COB, both of which are based on risk and meeting certain criteria. The Secure Beef Supply Plan has developed permit guidance for the movement of cattle, semen, and embryos (see Table 1). For more information about permits, refer to the USDA documents:
    - *Ready Reference Guide – Defining Permitted Movement, February 2017.*
    - *Ready Reference Guide – Permitting Process, February 2017.*
    - *Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP) Permitted Movement (Manual 6-0).*

Managed Movement of Animals in an FMD Response

Movement restrictions[2] of susceptible livestock species, germplasm (semen, embryos, oocytes) and animal products is one strategy for the control and containment of FMD during an outbreak in the U.S. However, prolonged movement restrictions will negatively impact the livestock industry and animal welfare. Livestock operations *affected* by movement restrictions but *not infected* with FMD will need to restart movement as soon as possible to support business continuity in a way that is consistent with mitigating the risk of spreading FMD. For more information, please see *Managed Movement of Susceptible Livestock Species in the U.S. during a Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak*, November 2019 *Overview* (two-pages) or the more detailed *Considerations for Regulatory Officials* (six-pages).

USDA recommends a 72-hour national movement standstill of susceptible species, semen, and embryos once FMD is diagnosed. Learn more about *What to Expect in a National Movement Standstill*. Pending the outbreak investigation, the standstill may be extended. It may take several days or weeks for the livestock industry, state and federal officials to understand the extent of the outbreak and have confidence that animals with no evidence of infection can move without spreading FMD. Once the national movement standstill lifts, movement restrictions may remain for the regulatory Control Areas(s) to limit risk of disease spread by animals, animal products, vehicles, and other equipment. Movement into, within, or out of Control Area(s) will be by permit only and based on the risk posed by that movement and the premises' ability to meet permit requirements. Cattle operations that follow the guidance in this SBS Plan will be better prepared to request a movement permit once movement restarts. Table 1 below, provides a summary of movement permit guidance. Movement permit guidance for cattle grazing federal public lands within an FMD control area is described in the *Movement Decision Criteria for Industry and Regulatory Officials Managing Cattle and Sheep Grazing Federal Public Lands during an FMD Outbreak* document. Movement permit guidance for bovine germplasm (semen, embryos, oocytes) and high genomic merit animals within an FMD control area is described in the *Bovine Germplasm Movement Plan (BGMP)*.

It is the Regulatory Officials' responsibility during an outbreak to detect, control, and contain FMD as quickly as possible with the ultimate goal of eradication. Responsible Regulatory Officials managing the incident will make permitting decisions regarding the movements of animals, germplasm (semen, embryos, oocytes), animal products and other movements that pose a risk of virus spread within, into, out of, and through Control Areas based on the unique characteristics of the outbreak, the status of the premises, and the risks and mitigations involved with the types of movement.

It is the producer's responsibility during an FMD outbreak to protect their animals from becoming infected, focusing on what they can control on their operation. To facilitate business continuity (movement), producers will need to provide assurances to the Responsible Regulatory Officials and the

[2] In this document the term "movement restrictions" will be used as a general term to encompass the language and implementation differences among federal movement recommendations and individual state plans.

destination premises that they are not contributing to the spread of disease nor putting their own animals at risk of exposure. Some movements carry more risk than others. Implementing enhanced biosecurity will be paramount to limiting disease spread. A written, enhanced biosecurity plan that can be fully implemented in an outbreak increases individual preparedness to prevent disease exposure and thus maintain COB. Producers should be ready to provide evidence that they have implemented all of the enhanced biosecurity measures recommended in the *SBS Self-Assessment Checklist for Enhanced Biosecurity for FMD Prevention* available on the SBS website. Additionally, producers should be prepared to manage their cattle operations if they are not allowed to move animals for several days or weeks. Review the *Contingency Planning Considerations for Producers during an FMD Outbreak* document for guidance.

Packers and processors are essential to the success of business continuity for the beef industry during an FMD outbreak. FMD is not a public health or food safety concern. Therefore, animals which pass ante-mortem and post-mortem inspection by USDA Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) are safe and wholesome for human consumption, even if they are in the pre-clinical or recovery stage of FMD infection. Many packing plants have on-site rendering capacity for non-edible products, so any virus in those products would be destroyed prior to leaving the packing plant. Following the announcement of an FMD outbreak, processing all healthy animals already at the slaughter facility as well as those in transit to the facility is the fastest way to reduce potential virus amplification and further spread of FMD. Processing healthy animals preserves high quality protein for human consumption and reduces the need for carcass disposal if animals were depopulated for disease control. Processing healthy animals from a regulatory Control Area could continue, even if FMD infected animals are suspected or proven to already be at the packing plant. Product that has passed FSIS inspection is safe for human consumption and may be released into commerce for human consumption.

Packing plant employees, livestock transporters/haulers, and others who contact animals or their bodily fluids must observe proper enhanced biosecurity protocols to avoid transmitting the FMD virus to susceptible animals when these individuals leave the plant. All personnel must be instructed on enhanced biosecurity steps to follow prior to and after leaving the plant. Guidance for livestock hauler/transporter enhanced biosecurity steps is available on the SBS website.

The SBS Plan includes guidance for producers and packers (when requesting) and officials (when evaluating requests) for animal and/or animal product movement permits. The Bovine Germplasm Movement Plan (BGMP) includes guidance for germplasm facilities[3] (when requesting) and officials (when evaluating requests) for germplasm and high genomic merit animal movement permits. There may be additional requirements depending on the scope of the outbreak. Following the guidance in the SBS Plan could enable movement sooner, once animal movement resumes.

Following the Guidance in the Secure Beef Supply Plan

During an outbreak, premises in a regulatory Control Area that need to move cattle with no evidence of FMD infection may need to comply with the SBS Plan guidelines to request and receive approval for a movement permit, provided their state follows the guidance in the SBS Plan. Responsible Regulatory Officials also may implement additional requirements depending on the scope of the outbreak. In addition, all interstate movements must meet existing movement/state entry requirements in addition to these outbreak-specific conditions. Implementing the guidance outlined in the SBS Plan before an outbreak may decrease the risk of disease exposure and spread. It also facilitates the eventual issuing of movement permits, for cattle premises with no evidence of infection, and for allied industries.

[3] For the purposes of this guidance, germplasm facilities are defined as those housing male or female donor animals that need to move one or more live animal(s), semen, or embryo(s) into or out of their facility. This includes semen production centers, embryo production centers, satellite collection centers, veterinary clinics, breeding facilities, and other livestock operations that are involved in the creation of bovine germplasm.

To Prepare Prior to an Outbreak:

Request a National Premises Identification Number (PremID or PIN) from the office of your State Animal Health Official (SAHO): Having a PIN facilitates requesting movement permits during an outbreak. A PIN is linked to the geospatial location reflecting the actual location of the animals on the premises. This includes a valid 911 address and a set of matching coordinates (latitude and longitude). A PIN is required for both the premises of origin and the premises of destination. Obtain a 7-digit alphanumeric PIN from the office of the State Animal Health Official (SAHO). When animals on a premises become infected, all premises with the same PIN number will be considered infected. Generally, it is best to have separate PINs for premises with animals reared off-site and accessed via a public road even if managed or owned by the same individual or corporation.

Producers who graze cattle on public lands (U.S. Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, etc.) are encouraged to have a PIN for their privately owned land (base property) if livestock reside there at any time. If regulatory action (quarantine, testing, movement permit) is needed during an outbreak for animals grazing public lands, USDA and the SAHO will assign a PIN.

Producers and packers are encouraged to validate their PIN with SAHOs to ensure their data on file accurately represents the location of the animals and not a mailbox at a residence or business affiliated with the animal premises. Validated PINs speed up communication and response during an outbreak. The National Pork Board provides an online premises verification resource for all species. Submit corrections to the office of your SAHO.

Develop an enhanced biosecurity plan: Stringent biosecurity measures are essential to protect the herd from virus exposure. Cattle operation managers/owners should work with their veterinarian to develop a written, operation-specific biosecurity plan that meets or exceeds the items in the *Self-Assessment Checklist for Enhanced Biosecurity for FMD Prevention* (Biosecurity Checklist for Feedlots and Cattle on Pasture). These documents describe the steps needed to decrease the risk of FMD virus exposure from multiple routes (personnel, vehicles, semen, manure, carcasses, etc.). The Biosecurity Checklists, the *Information Manual for Enhanced Biosecurity for FMD Prevention* (assists in writing a biosecurity plan), enhanced biosecurity plan templates, and materials for educating individuals that work on the operation (in English and Spanish) are available on the SBS website. Producers are encouraged to implement as many items as is practical before an FMD outbreak occurs to help protect animals on the operation from virus exposure. Owners/managers should be capable of implementing the remaining biosecurity measures if an outbreak occurs. Producers are encouraged to develop this plan with their herd veterinarian and share it, upon request, with their SAHO. There are some unique challenges for cattle grazing public lands. Producers are encouraged to develop an enhanced biosecurity plan for their base property if livestock reside there at any time. Additional guidance documents are found on the SBS website, including the *Just-in-Time Biosecurity and Exposure Questionnaire for FMD: Livestock Grazing Public Lands*.

Designate and train personnel on the cattle operation to monitor for FMD and potentially collect samples (surveillance): Animal caretakers should be trained to observe animals and recognize abnormal findings (clinical signs and/or changes in production parameters) and record their observations (normal or abnormal). All abnormal observations should be reported during an outbreak. These specially trained personnel are referred to as Cattle Health Monitors. Training materials for disease monitoring include presentations, handouts, and posters that visually depict clinical signs of FMD in cattle. Educational materials are available in English and Spanish on the SBS website. Health record keeping templates also are available for operations that do not already use a system to document health observations and production parameters. Producers should establish a relationship with a USDA Category II Accredited Veterinarian if they have not already, as they may be a necessary component of disease monitoring (surveillance) during an outbreak. USDA provides an Accredited Veterinarian locator on their website. Sample collection types and number have not yet been determined. Responsible Regulatory Officials will provide guidance in an outbreak.

Maintain movement records for traceability: Premises in a Control Area will be required to provide information at the beginning of an outbreak to identify potential exposure to the disease. Maintaining accurate records of movement of animals, feed, supplies, equipment, personnel, and visitors enables producers to provide accurate information for tracing backward and forward. Movement records should also include the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of animal transporters/haulers, employed personnel, feed suppliers, etc. Maintaining electronic records is preferred, when possible, but paper copies may also be acceptable. If needed, sample movement logs are available on the SBS website. This information can help define the scope of an outbreak, but it can be daunting to provide a lot of detail on short notice. Producers can use the *Secure Beef Supply Practice Questionnaire for FMD Exposure* to get a feel for the information needed in an outbreak.

Once FMD is Diagnosed in the U.S.:

Implement the operation-specific enhanced biosecurity plan: If FMD is diagnosed anywhere in the U.S., owners/managers of the beef operation should review, update as necessary, and implement their operation-specific biosecurity plan to minimize the risk of exposing their animals. If the beef operation is located in an FMD Control Area, Responsible Regulatory Officials may require that all of the items on the Biosecurity Checklist, and possibly others, be implemented before animal movement is allowed. Producers with cattle grazing public lands may be asked to complete the *Just-in-Time Biosecurity and Exposure Questionnaire for FMD: Livestock Grazing Public Lands*.

Conduct disease monitoring and potentially collect samples (surveillance): The document, *Surveillance Guidance to Support the Secure Beef Supply (SBS) Continuity of Business Plan during an FMD Outbreak* summarizes some potential surveillance options for cattle premises within a Control Area to demonstrate a lack of evidence of FMD virus infection to support continuity of business movements. At this time, the ability to provide a very high degree of confidence that animals are negative for FMD virus using currently available, validated laboratory testing methods, and sample collection protocols for large groups or certain types of animals is limited. Diagnostic tests to be performed and sampling protocols may evolve throughout the outbreak based on new knowledge and technology. Protocols will be determined by Responsible Regulatory Officials and may include:

- Virological surveillance (such as oral swabs)
- Conducting Active Observational Surveillance (AOS) daily by trained Cattle Health Monitors employed by the premises
- Periodic inspection of cattle and AOS records by Accredited Veterinarians under the authority of Responsible Regulatory Officials
- Follow-up laboratory testing for animals with any suspicious clinical signs

Provide movement records for traceability: Premises within an FMD Control Area will be part of the disease investigation to identify potential exposure to the virus. Accurate records speed up the traceability process and allow faster determination of the premises status – Contact, At-Risk, or Monitored. This information would help demonstrate that the premises has not had specific contact with Infected, Suspect, or Contact Premises in a Control Area. Find USDA definitions for traceability and premises designations at the end of this document. These designations guide additional surveillance and permitting decisions. Animal movement permits are not issued to Infected, Suspect, or Contact Premises due to the risk of disease spread.

Requesting a Secure Food Supply Movement Permit during an Outbreak

Before requesting a Secure Food Supply movement permit for cattle or cattle products (semen or embryos), both the premises of origin and the premises of destination, including packing plants, need to have a National PIN, and the destination premises and State need to be willing to accept the risk of receiving the animals or their products. Each premises requesting a movement permit must be registered through the office of their SAHO and/or established as a premises in the USDA's Emergency

Management Response System (EMRS) before requesting a permit. EMRS is the USDA APHIS official system of record for all animal health incidents. For premises following the guidance in the SBS Plan, permits should be requested through the EMRS Customer Permit Gateway or similar State-approved permitting system that is capable of exporting data required for USDA APHIS EMRS during an outbreak. If a State elects to use their own information management system to handle permitting, the information must, in near real-time, be linked into EMRS, especially for interstate movements where approval of both origin and destination State must be granted and Unified Incident Command be informed. Further information on Secure Food Supply permits and permitted movements is available in the document *FAD PReP Manual 6-0: Permitted Movement*. It contains detailed information on the different types of permits and movements as well as thorough explanations of the permitting process.

Provide the following information (it will be recorded in EMRS):

- Permit class—where you want to move animals or animal products in relation to the Control Area (such as out of Control Area).
- Permit reason—why you want to move animals or animal products (such as direct to slaughter).
- Origin premises—location (physical latitude/longitude) including validated National PIN must be entered in a State information system. For permits issued by EMRS or the EMRS Gateway, the National PIN must be entered into EMRS. (State information systems and EMRS will share data before or during incidents.)
- Destination premises—location (physical latitude/longitude) including validated National PIN must be entered in a State information system. The destination premises must sign a statement that they understand the risk of accepting animals from the Control Area. For permits issued by EMRS or the EMRS Gateway, the National PIN must be entered into EMRS. (State information systems and EMRS will share data before or during incidents.)
- Item(s) permitted—category of what you want to move (groups of animals, germplasm, feed, manure, etc.).
- Item class—specifically what is moving (such as steers to slaughter, donor cows).
- Duration/span of permit—first movement date, how long the permit is valid, frequency of movements, and over what time period movements are expected to occur.

For any permitted movement, the Origin State can request documentation from the premises making the request, and attach that documentation to the permit request in EMRS or make the information available through a workable data management system. This documentation may include:

- Trace back/forward information. Evidence that the premises is NOT Infected, NOT Suspect, and NOT a Contact Premises.
- A completed copy of the Biosecurity Checklist and the operation-specific enhanced biosecurity plan.
- Written assurance by the producer of compliance with the Biosecurity Checklist.
- Information demonstrating normal health status for the animals on the production premises involved (such as cattle health monitoring documents and/or Certificate of Veterinary Inspection signed by an Accredited Veterinarian that inspected the animals destined for load out).
- Diagnostic testing results from samples tested. When submitting samples for testing, it is imperative that the National PIN for the location sampled is always included with the diagnostic submission (the recommended type and number of samples to collect and frequency of collection are being developed and may change as the outbreak progresses).
- For animal movements to another operation, the destination premises must indicate that they understand and accept the risks associated with receiving the animals. States may require a signed form be submitted with the permit request.

Completed movement permit requests will be reviewed first by the Origin State. The permit can be recommended for approval to Destination State, not recommended for approval by Destination State, or rejected. If approved by the Origin State, then the Destination State reviews and approves or rejects the

permit. The destination premises may also reject a permit. If the permit request is not approved, an explanation for denial will be provided in the EMRS Gateway. If approved, the producer will receive the approved permit (likely as an electronic PDF) from the appropriate official working to inform Unified Incident Command; it is also available for download directly from the EMRS Gateway. The permitted movement must comply with all requirements on the permit; all subsequent permitted movements associated with that permit must be submitted to and recorded in EMRS through the permit Gateway or other State-approved data information system for permits.

Table 1. Summary of Movement Permit Guidance for Cattle, Semen and Embryos located within a Control Area during an FMD Response

Permitting Guidance for Movement of Cattle/Semen/Embryos	Condition Met?
1. Traceability information is available (PIN, GPS Coordinates, and information on type and number of animals/quantity of semen/embryos moved)	Yes
2. Biosecurity measures listed in the Biosecurity Checklist are in place and acceptable to Responsible Regulatory Officials	Yes
3. Trace back/forward information is acceptable; premises is not Infected, Suspect or Contact	Yes
4. Destination premises and State are willing to accept the cattle/semen/embryos	Yes
5. No evidence of infection based on disease monitoring (surveillance)	Yes
Permit guidance to move cattle/semen/embryos if all above responses are "Yes"	Consider Issuing MOVEMENT PERMIT

For movement permit guidance for cattle grazing federal public lands within an FMD control area, read the *Movement Decision Criteria for Industry and Regulatory Officials Managing Cattle and Sheep Grazing Federal Public Lands during an FMD Outbreak*.

For more specific movement permit guidance for high genomic merit cattle and germplasm (semen, embryos, oocytes), read the *Bovine Germplasm Movement Plan (BGMP)*.

Acknowledgments

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Comments

Please email comments or suggested edits for improvement to: sbsinfo@iastate.edu

Additional Resources

The Secure Beef Supply website has additional resources available.

USDA Premises Definitions

The following definition is from the USDA Animal Disease Traceability website, April 2024:

- Animal disease traceability: knowing where diseased and at-risk animals are, where they've been, and when is important to ensure a rapid response when animal disease events take place.

The definitions below are from the USDA Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP) Foot-and-Mouth Disease Response Plan: The Red Book, October 2020:

- Infected Premises (IP): Premises where a presumptive positive case or confirmed positive case exists based on laboratory results, compatible clinical signs, FMD case definition, and international standards.
- Contact Premises (CP): Premises with susceptible animals that may have been exposed to FMD, either directly or indirectly, including but not limited to exposure to animals, animal products, fomites, or people from IP.
- Suspect Premises (SP): Premises under investigation due to the presence of susceptible animals reported to have clinical signs compatible with FMD. This is intended to be a short-term premises designation.
- At-Risk Premises (ARP): Premises that have susceptible animals, but none of those susceptible animals have clinical signs compatible with FMD. Premises objectively demonstrates that it is not an IP, CP, or SP. ARP seek to move susceptible animals or products within the Control Area by permit. Only ARP are eligible to become MP.
- Monitored Premises (MP): Premises objectively demonstrates that it is not an Infected, Contact, or Suspect Premises. Only ARP are eligible to become MP. Monitored Premises meet a set of defined criteria in seeking to move susceptible animals or products out of the Control Area by permit.

Updates

(2024) The web links were updated to align with the changes made on the USDA website and to meet accessibility standards. The content related to grazing public lands was modified to reflect new guidance developed upon completion of a multidisciplinary project funded by USDA NADPRP. The content related to high genomic merit animals and germplasm was modified to reflect new guidance developed upon completion of a multidisciplinary project funded by USDA NADPRP. Additional resources were added: "*What to Expect in a National Movement Standstill*" and "*Livestock Hauler/Transporter Enhanced Biosecurity Steps*".